ABSTRACT We consider wireless multi-hops networks in which each node desires to securely transmit the message. To guarantee secure transmission, we employ an independent randomization encoding strategy to encode the confidential message. We formulate the problem as network utility maximization. Based on the secure communication strategy, we first propose a simple and provable dynamic control algorithm for the case that the length of secrecy codewords is infinite. The control algorithm not only satisfies end-to-end perfect secrecy constraint, but also keeps the network stability. Next, we further consider the case that a finite length of secrecy codewords is performed, in which the possibility of perfect secrecy is eliminated. For this case, we develop an improved control algorithm, subject to network stability and secrecy outage requirement. On the basis of the Lyapunov optimization method, we obtain the optimal algorithm, which is decomposed into end-to-end secrecy encoding, flow control, and routing schedule. The simulation results show that both of the proposed algorithms can achieve a utility result, arbitrarily close to optimal value. Finally, the performance of the proposed control policies is validated with various network conditions. INDEX TERMS Wireless networks, secrecy encoding, network control, Lyapunov optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless multi-hops networks is a decentralized network which is contained by a set of nodes. The message is transmitted over the wireless channel and in multi-hops mode. Since the wireless channel is a broadcast channel, the data transmission is easy to be eavesdropped. Therefore, when designing a network, in addition to considering the quality of service (QoS) constraint, the data secrecy transmission should also be involved. In 1975, Wyner [2] opened a ground-breaking work on the data secrecy transmission over wireless channel. After that, lots of studies had been done on the secrecy transmission of wireless networks. Liang et al. [3] considered a cellular network where the base station needed to transmit data to multiuser confidentially, they designed a dynamic control algorithm to maximize the network utility by employing infinite secrecy encoding block. Since secrecy outage was inevitable, Wang et al. [4] The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Waleed Ejaz. investigated the secrecy outage in a multiuser networks. To minimize the secrecy outage probability, they employed stochastic network optimization framework to design a control policy with security and network stability constraint. Later, Sheng et al. [5] also considered a multi-user wireless scenario with imperfectly known channels. They aimed to maximize the worst case of secrecy throughput and developed an optimal power allocation algorithm. While in [6] , Koksal et al. investigated a cross-layer secure in wireless network and proposed a dynamic control algorithm to maximize the network utility. After that, in [7] , aiming to minimize the secrecy outage probability, they extended the dynamic control algorithm to cognitive radio network and developed a bandwidth and resource allocation algorithm.
Based on the works mentioned above, the secrecy control problem in wireless network has been extensively studied, such as OFDMA-based wireless network [8] , [9] and cognitive wireless network [10] - [13] . Although these security control algorithms improved the network performance, most of them focused on the cellular networks. While for the multi-hops wireless networks, there were few works involved. Neely et al. [14] , Cruz and Santhanam [15] considered a multi-hop wireless network and proposed an optimal control to maximize the network throughput. However, they did not consider the data transmission security. In [16] - [18] , the authors, considered a large scale wireless networks and analyze the secrecy throughput with ideal control policies. As for the mobile ad hoc networks, Li et al. [19] jointly exploited cooperative jamming and secrecy guard zone scheme and derived the exact secrecy throughput based on the physical layer security technology. To enhanced security, Zhu et al. [20] employed directional antennas and evaluated the secure secrecy performance in millimeter wave ad hoc networks. While for the wireless multi-hop networks, He and Yener [21] proposed a dynamic control algorithm in multi-hop line wireless network. Recently, Sarikaya et al. [22] considered a multi-hop network with random and independent node distribution. To guarantee the secrecy transmission, they developed a strategy to encode the confidential message with multi-path transmission and infinite coding block length. By using stochastic network optimization [23] , they developed a control policy to stable the network and maximize the network utility, which is joint by end-to-end secrecy encoding, routing scheme and resource allocation algorithm. However, most of the works mentioned above only focused on cellular networks security or multi-hop wireless networks with multi-path transmission strategy to guarantee the security.
In this paper, we consider the secrecy control problem in multi-hop wireless network. Specifically, we firstly aim to achieve perfect secrecy communication and network stabilization. To guarantee the perfect secrecy, we propose an independent randomization encoding strategy with infinite blocklength. Based on the secrecy encoding strategy, we design a control policy to maximize the network utility function. The control algorithm gives a decision on the arrival confidential message. According to the stochastic network optimization, the control algorithm can be decomposed into flow control, routing and resource allocation. Next, since the perfect secrecy constraint requires infinite encoding blocklength which would be result in infinite delay, we further consider the practical case with finite encoding blocklength. Due to the finite blocklength, the perfect secrecy is not possible. Consequently, we define a secrecy outage and impose a constraint on the probability that confidential message experiences a secrecy outage. We develop an improved control policy, which is decomposed into end-to-end secrecy encoding, flow control and routing scheduling. Such that the network stability and secrecy outage constraint are satisfied. Finally, We prove that the performance of proposed control policies can close to the optimal utility result asymptotically.
In the rest of this paper, we introduce the system model and problem formulation in Section II. Section III analyzes the independent randomization encoding strategy. Section IV proposes a control policy with infinite secrecy codewords, and analyzes the performance of proposed policy. Section V improves control policy with finite secrecy codewords. Section VI evaluates the proposed policies with various network conditions. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODELS
The wireless multi-hops network is formed by M legitimate nodes and L links connecting the nodes. As shown in Fig. 1 , For a link l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, let T (l) and D(l) be the transmitter and receiver nodes of link l. Let E be the set of eavesdroppers and each node wish to transmitting its confidential message to destination against the eavesdroppers. We assume the network operates on a time-slotted model and the slot is normalized to integral unit t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We also assume perfect instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI), including legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, can be obtained, which is a block fading channel and follows independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). Let S(t) = (S 1 (t), . . . , S L (t)) represent the channel state vector of link set L in slot t, where S l (t) is the channel state of link l. Note that S l (t) contains N channels which implicates the perfect secrecy [2] can not satisfy if N < ∞. Let R l (t) and R e l (t) denote the achievable rate on link l and the maximum overhearing rate of eavesdropper e, respectively. Since the network is a multi-commodity problem, each flow is identified by its destination node c ∈ {1, . . . , M }. Let λ cs n (t) be the arrival confidential data at node n and destined for node c, which is bounded by λ c max n . As shown in Fig. 1 , there is a control valve at each node to admit R cs n (t) confidential data into the network. For each flow c, let Q c n (t) be the queue backlog at node n. If c = n, Q n n (t) = 0 for all n and t. Since the wireless channel is a broadcast channel, the confidential message is overheard by eavesdroppers. To guarantee the secure transmission of confidential message, we employ Wyner's encoding scheme [2] to encode the confidential message. Specifically, at each slot t and link l, using independent randomization encoding strategy, the transmitter, according to R l (t) andR e l (t), encodes a mount of R s n (t) (may contain multiple flows) confidential message from its arrival data. Such that the maximum output confidential message rate R s l (t) can be denoted as
, secrecy outage occurs. Using this secrecy encoding strategy, we can guarantee the transmission security in each link. All the parameters have been defined or would be used are presented in Table 1 .
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We aim to design a control policy to stabilize the network, as well as satisfy the end-to-end secrecy communication. Specifically, the policy controls the rate of confidential message admitted to the network, and determines the links to transmit. To evaluate the performance of the proposed policy, a set of utility functions U c n (r cs n ) are defined, which represent the ''satisfaction'' of the rate to send confidential message from node n to c,r cs n bits/slot is the rate of time average confidential message rate. For simplicity, we assume the utility function set U c n (r cs n ) is a concave and non-decreasing function. Then the control problem can be formulated as follows:
where λ cs n (t) is the arrival rate of confidential message at node n and destined to node c in slot t. The constraint in (1) indicates that the admitted confidential message is less than the arrival rate.r cs n denotes the achievable long-term average confidential data rate, which can be defined as:
where R cs n (t) represents the confidential data rate admitted in each slot t.
III. SECURE MULTI-HOP TRANSMISSION STRATEGY
To guarantee the secrecy transmission, we use a codebook to encode the confidential message in accordance with the maximum eavesdropper's rate R * e . The end-to-end confidential message is secured against from the eavesdroppers if
• the error probability of decoding the confidential message at each hop can be made arbitrarily small as N → ∞, and
• the confidential message leakage rate of eavesdroppers over the entire path, i.e.,
, can be made arbitrarily small ∀e ∈ E as N → ∞ for almost all source and destination pairs. As shown in Fig.2 can be made arbitrarily small, then the second condition is satisfied, where Y e is observation vector of eavesdropper e ∈ E in the h-th hop. As for the confidential message security, we design a secrecy codebook for each hop's transmission, which is designed in accordance with the possible maximum rate of eavesdropper. Specifically, for ith hop, the encoder generates 2 , we get Equation (3), as shown at the top of the next page.
In Equation (3), the step (a) holds since Y e * is a worse set of observations with respect to that of
) and the eavesdropper can intercept randomization message given the bin index (Fano's inequality), as well as the second term of summation is zero. Specifically, let P e,e * i Pr{M x i = M x i } denote the error probability of decoding, whereM x i is the estimate of
). Then the following inequality holds
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with some 2 → 0 as N → ∞, step (e) hold since
|X i ) and the entropy is not increased with conditioning, and (f ) follows that
). Let = 1 + 2 , we have, for any given > 0,
IV. CONTROL OF MULTI-HOP NETWORK WITH SECRECY A. CONTROL ALGORITHM
In this section, we design a dynamic control algorithm to deliver the confidential message over multi-hop routing. Specifically, the network controller makes decision in each slot:
• Resource allocation: determine the confidential data rate vector R s (t) = (R s 1 (t), . . . , R s L (t)) on each link.
• Routing/scheduling: for each link l and flow c, the confidential data rate R cs l (t) satisfies c R cs l (t) ≤ R l (t) − R e l (t). For a given node n, the confidential data arrival rate of flow c is λ cs n (t), which is bounded by λ c max n . In each slot t, a network control valve would choose R cs n (t) confidential data in the arrival data λ cs n (t), such that we can stabilize the network. Let n and n be the set of all links l such that T ( n ) = n and D( n ) = n, respectively. Thus, in each slot t, the queue evolution Q c n (t) can be represented as:
Queue Stable Definition: A queue Q(t) can be defined as strongly stable with random service and arrival rate if:
We firstly present the control algorithm as follows, which can be separated into flow control, routing and resource allocation algorithms. Next, we will give the derivation of the control algorithm and prove the algorithm is optimal.
Multi-hop Secrecy Control Algorithm (MSCA):
• Flow control: For each node n, observing the queue backlog Q c n (t) of each commodity c ∈ {1, . . . , N }, picks up R cs n (t) confidential data that solves the following optimization problem:
where parameter V influences the performance of the control algorithm and V > 0.
• Routing and Scheduling: For each link l and node n, the network controller compares the queue backlog between all neighboring nodes j and n (where 
The optimal secrecy rate of R s l (t) is allocated to flow c * l (t) on link l.
B. ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE
In this part, we will prove that the proposed algorithm can acquire a performance arbitrarily close to the optimal value, as well as stabilize all queues in the network. i.e., Theorem 1: If the secrecy rate is finite, i.e., R cs l < ∞ for all links, then for any positive parameter V > 0, the proposed MSCA algorithm can achieve a performance:
lim inf 
r cs n (t)
Theorem 1 indicates that our algorithm not only stabilize the network, but also maximize utility functions. Based on the stochastic network optimization [23] , we prove Theorem 1 as follows.
Let Q(t) = (Q c n (t)) denote the queue length set and define a Lyapunov function L(Q(t)) = n,c (Q c n (t)) 2 . The admitted confidential data rate R cs n (t) would influence the network stabilization. Since the arrival confidential data is bounded, we have n,c U c n (R cs n (t)) ≤ U max for all t. Let U * represent the ''target utility'' value of utility functions. Base on the stochastic network optimization [23] , the conditional Lyapunov drift Q(t) can be expressed as:
where the conditional expectation is relative to the random on-step queue evolutions on the basis of current queue states Q(t 
then the time average utility and queues can be expressed as:
lim inf
wherer cs n (t) is the long-term average secrecy rate and defined in (2) .
Proof: We firstly assume Equation (14) holds. Taking expectations over all queues Q(t) and substituting Lyapunov drift (Q(t)) into Equation (13), we have:
where θ n,c E l∈ n R cs l (t) − l∈ n R cs l (t) − R cs n (t) which is bounded. According to the MSCA algorithm, Equation (17) always holds. For a positive integer K , making a summation on (17) over t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K − 1}, we have:
Due to the non-negativity of Lyapunov function and n,c U c n (R cs n (τ )) ≤ U max , let each term of Equation (18) divide K θ , rearranging (18) we have:
Taking the lim sup as K → ∞, we derive the queue bound in (15) .
Similarly, rearranging Equation (18) and dividing by K θ , we obtain the utility bound:
Using Jensen's inequality, we have
τ =0 E{R cs n (τ )} since the utility function U c n (r) is concave. Taking the lim inf as K → ∞ and Substituting it into Equation (20), we complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 requests the control algorithm needs to greedily minimize the Lyapunov drift and penalty:
Actually, the MSCA control algorithm is indeed greedily to minimize the above formula. Based on the queue evolution in (5), the Lyapunov drift can be rewritten as:
− R cs n (t)|Q(t)}. (22) We add the conditional penalty n,c E{VU c n (R cs n )|Q(t)} to the both side of Equation (22), and define function (Q(t)) and (Q(t)) as follows:
Then, the Equation (22) can be rewritten as:
≤ MB − (Q(t)) − (Q(t)). (25)
In each slot t, observing the queue state Q(t), we find that the proposed MSCA algorithm greedily minimize the right hand side (RHS) of Equation (25) over all flow control policies, routing schemes and resource allocation strategies. Therefore, the following Lemma holds:
Lemma 2: Based on the proposed MSCA algorithm, the functions (Q(t)) and (Q(t)) satisfy:
where (r * cs n ) represents any possible secrecy rates that satisfy (1) for all n, and (R * cs l ) denotes any possible (potentially randomized) decisions on routing schemes and resource allocation strategies.
The flow control policy (7) of MSCA algorithm maximizes (Q(t)) over all feasible selection on R cs n (t). In addition, (Q(t)) is maximized by the routing and resource allocation policy. Switching the summation, we have:
Therefore, let MSCA (Q(t)) represent the function values of link rate R cs l (t) in MSCA algorithm, and * (Q(t)) achieved by R * cs l (t) denote the function values of any feasible rate (possible via randomization), then, according to Equation (28), we have:
where
V. CONTROL WITH FINITE SECRECY CODEWORDS
In Section IV, we have proposed a control algorithm according to the secrecy encoding in Section III, where the confidential message is encoded into an infinite codewords. Thus, it would take infinite long delay to decode the confidential message. In this section, we remove the assumption of infinite codewords, i.e., N < ∞. Since the confidential message is encoded into a finite codeword, the perfect secrecy for all message can not be guaranteed. Thus, to embody the security of confidential message, we define the notion of secrecy outage. The secrecy outage occurs if the confidential message is intercepted by eavesdroppers. To evaluate the state of secrecy outage, we assume each source node can collect the knowledge of the confidential message accumulated by eavesdroppers. Such that the source node can identify the occurrence of secrecy outage. In addition, according to the state of secrecy outage, each secrecy codeword k would encode different confidential message R k,cs n . Thus, an encoding scheme needs to be designed to satisfy the requirement of secrecy outage.
Let g be a link set that can be transmitted simultaneously, and G denote the collection of all sets of the link set g, where set G is determined by the network interference model. We also define an indicator variable I g (t) to represent the decision of the network in slot t, where I g (t) = 1 means the link set g is scheduled in slot t, otherwise it is 0. Similar, indicator variable I n,c ij = 1, if link (i, j) is employed to transmit the flow generated by source n to node c, otherwise it is 0. Thus, in slot t, the flow rate of source n to node c at link
Let R p,cs n be the average confidential message rate transmitted from node n to c, p out n (R k,cs n ) denote the average secrecy outage of codeword k at node n, γ n be the maximum allowable portion of confidential message intercepted by eavesdropper. Then the optimization problem can be formulated as 
n p out n (R k,cs n ). Constraint (33) guarantees the average confidential message rate is not larger than the message arrival rate; Constraint (34) is the input flows and output flows constraint at the intermediate nodes; Constraint (35) is the requirement of maximum allowable portion of confidential message intercepted by eavesdropper.
Similar to the control algorithm proposed in Section IV, we exploit the Lyapunov penalty and drift to solve this problem. However, due to the secrecy codeword finite and secrecy outage occurrence, the queue model need to be improved. In particular, as shown in Fig. 3 , source node is equipped with two separate queues which are operated at two different time scales. The first queue stores the message admitted into the network and Q p,c n (t) denotes the queue length in slot t. Let R p,cs n (t) be the admitted confidential message in slot t, which is transmitted from source node n to destination node c. R p,cs n represents the long-term average admitted confidential message. The departure of first queue occurs only when a new secrecy codeword is generated in slot t. Let k n (t) be the number of secrecy codewords generated in slot t, and R k n (t),cs n denote the confidential message encoded in k n (t)-th secrecy codeword. Since there are N channels, where N < ∞, the actual transmitted confidential message is NR k n (t),cs n and the length of secrecy codeword is NR c n , The second queue is a partial queue and let P c n (t) denote the queue length. In this queue, the data departures or not is depended the scheduling and routing policy. Only when the queue is empty, i.e., P c n (t) = 0, a new secrecy codeword is allowed to admit into the queue. Thus, we have, if P c n (t) = 0, k n (t + 1) = k n (t)+1. According to the queue models above, the evolution of queues can be expressed as:
For each intermediate node, there exists a queue to store the packet from source node n to destination node c. Let Q n,c i (t) be the queue length. Then we have
To evaluate the state of secrecy outage, source node n needs to track the accumulated of confidential message at each eavesdropper. Let Z n,c e (t) denote the number of bits that must be accumulated by eavesdropper e in slot t to decode the k n (t)-th confidential message. Note that, for any eavesdroppers e, if Z n,c e (t) = 0, then secrecy outage of the k n (t)-th confidential message is occurred. LetR e (t) be the maximum rate that eavesdropper can be achieved, then the evolution of queue Z n,c e (t) can be denoted as
For the constraint (35), a virtual queue Y k,c n is constructed, which is employed to record the state of secrecy outage. Thus, if the k-th confidential message is secrecy outage, then the arrival rate of queue Y k,c n is R k,cs n , else it is 0. The evolution of queue Y k,c n is:
The arrival and departure of virtual queue Y k,c n is the number of confidential message bits undergoing secrecy outage, and the number of confidential message bits allowed to be outage, which is constraint by parameter γ n . The value of Y k,c n indicates the amount that we have exceeded the allowable secrecy outage constraint. Hence, the larger of Y k,c n , the more conservative our control algorithm needs to do meeting these constraints. That is, less confidential message R k n (t),cs n is encoded into the k n (t)-th codeword.
A. CONTROL ALGORITHM
For the secrecy transmission strategy with finite secrecy codewords, the control algorithm is:
Multi-hop Secrecy Control Algorithm with Finite Block (MSCAFB):
• End-to-End Encoding: At each new secrecy codeword generation, i.e., P c n (t) = 0, let k n (t + 1) = k n (t) + 1, the confidential message R k n (t+1),cs n allowed to encode into a new codeword satisfies:
• Flow Control: In each slot t, for a given parameter V , the admitted confidential message at each source node n is:
Which is similar to the problem in (7).
• Scheduling: In each slot t, if I g (t) = 1 and I n,c ij (t) = 1, then the flow of node n is on the link (i, j) ∈ g and the scheduler selects the set of l * , where
The term
n (t) is used to normalize it to the value of other queues. Note that, the long-term average secrecy outage p out n (r) is increasing with variable r. Once r increases, secrecy codeword is encoded with less randomization bits, such that eavesdropper can intercept the confidential message with higher probability. Hence, with the queue length Q p,c n (t) increasing, the confidential message R k n (t),cs n is increased. While it decreases with the increasing of virtual queue length Y k n (t),c n , such that the constraints of problem (32) are satisfied.
B. ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE
Similar to the analysis in Section IV, using the Theorem of Lyapunov penalty and drift, we can also prove that the proposed control algorithm can close to the optimal arbitrarily. Let 
Observing the state of all queues, we have the conditional expectation of on-step queuing evolutions, i.e., Lyapunov drift is:
Substituting the evolution expressions of all queues, we obtain the upper bound of Lyapunov drift is:
Since the maximum transmission power is finite, all the rates of network would be bounded. Additionally, the arrival rate λ cmax n is also bounded. Hence, the parameter B is a nonnegative constant, which is similar to (14) .
Let the Lyapunov drift minus V E n,c U (R p,cs n )| (t) , where V is a weight parameter, we obtain the Lyapunov drift and penalty equation:
According to the Lyapunov optimization theorem [23] and substituting (46) to (47), the upper bound of U ( (t)) can be expressed as:
Rearranging and observing the RHS of (48), we find that the MSCAFB algorithm indeed minimizes the right hand side of (48). If the arrival rates of each node are in the feasible region, based on the work in [23] , there must exists a stationary scheduling, flow control and end-to-end encoding policy, which select the users and link rates independent of queue length and only relate to the channel statistics. It indicates that, if the channel statistics can be known priori, the optimal control policy can be found as the solution of a deterministic policy. Let U * be the optimal value of problem (32), R * cs n and µ * n denote the feasible and optimal arrival rate and transmission rate, respectively. Then, for all queues and any constants δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 , there must exists a network control policy that is independent of all queue lengths and satisfies the following inequalities:
Since the MSCAFB indeed minimizes the RSH of (48), such that any stationary control policies (including the optimal policy) need to satisfy (48). Inserting (49), (50) and (51) into (48), we get the following upper bound of our control algorithm:
RHS of (48)
Rearrange (52), we obtain the performance of MSCAFB algorithm.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Considering the network model in Fig. 1 , we assume the channel is an i.i.d Rayleigh fading channel and normalize the transmit power to noise be 1. Let h i,j denote the channel gain between transmitter i and receiver j, which follows an exponential distribution and the mean of each channel gain is assumed in Table 2 . Then, the achievable link rate between transmitter i and receiver j is R i,j (t) = log(1 + h i,j (t)). Correspondingly, the leakage rate from transmitter i to eavesdropper e is R i,e (t) = log(1 + h i,e (t)). We consider the utility function as a logarithmic function, i.e., U c n (t) = κ + log(R cs n (t)), where κ = 3 and R cs n (t) denotes the secrecy rate admitted in node n at slot t. We assume the confidential message arrival rate at each user follows an i.i.d Bernoulli process with parameter λ.
We firstly study the performance of MSCA algorithm. In the simulation, each link is set to unit bandwidth, we assume the maximum average arrival rate of confidential data is 2 bit/s. The parameter V varies in the set {10, 20, 80}. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present the simulation results, where each value is collected by running 5000 times. Fig. 4 reflects the relation of average confidential message arrival rate and the utility function. Fig. 5 shows the state of average queue backlog in the network.
The simulation results show that: 1) For a fixed V , when the arrival rate of confidential data is low, Fig. 4 depicts that the utility value linearly increases with the admitted confidential data. The reason is that, if the amount of arrival confidential data is low, almost all the confidential data can be admitted into network. 2) When the amount of arrival confidential data exceed the network secrecy capacity region, the network turns into saturation and partial confidential data can be admitted. Not surprisingly, varing the parameter V from 10 to 80, we find that the utility value increases closer to the optimal value. 3) While in Fig. 5 , the state of average queue backlog is presented. The simulation result shows that the average queue backlog increases with V dramatically, which indicates that the transmission delay is increased with V . Thus, the selection of parameter V is indeed a tradeoff between average utility value and short-term system performance. To optimize the utility value and delay performance, we will discuss the optimization of parameter V .
According to [23] and (16), the long-term average utility is proportion to 1/V , such that we can rewrite the utility function as n,c U c n (r cs n (t)) ≈ n,c U c n (r * cs n ) − BM /V , where n,c U c n (r * cs n ) denotes the optimal value and is a constant. Hence, the utility function is an increasing hyperbolic function of parameter V and a good operating point would be to pick a V value where an unit increases in V yields a very small reduction in utility. At this point, the utility gains may not be worth the delay increase resulting from increasing V (since delay is proportional to V ). Let η > 0 be the slope of utility function n,c U c n (r cs n (t)). Differentiating to V , i.e., Next, we analyze the performance of MSCAFB algorithm and compare with MSCA algorithm. Fig. 6 reflects the influence of secrecy codeword length on the network utility, as well as comparing with infinite secrecy codeword. The average arrival of confidential message is 2bit/s and the parameter V is 80. The maximum allowable portion of confidential message γ n is chosen from {0.05, 0.1, 0.2}, and the secrecy codeword length varies from {50, 100, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000} bits. From Fig. 6 , we find: 1) When the secrecy codeword length is 50 bits, the network utility is only 30% of the optimal value. 2) With the increasing of secrecy codeword length, the network utility is increased. When secrecy codeword length is up to 1000 bits, the network utility trends to be gentle, but closes to the value with infinite secrecy codeword. The reason is that, when the secrecy codeword length is small, subject to the constraint of γ n , the confidential message inserted to the codeword is decreased. Such that the network utility is low, and vice versa.
3) The network utility is increased with the value of γ n . The reason is that, with γ n increasing, more confidential message can be inserted into a secrecy codeword. Particularly, when γ n = 0.2 and secrecy codeword length is 1000 bits, the network utility is larger than that of infinite secrecy codeword. In order to depict the influence of γ n on the network utility, we have Fig. 7 .
In Fig. 7 , assuming the secrecy codeword length is {100, 1000, 4000} bits, we vary γ n from 0.05 to 0.5. The results show that: 1) With γ n increasing, we have the similar results with Fig. 6 . 2) With the increasing of secrecy codeword length, the threshold of γ n at which network utility is larger than that of infinite secrecy codeword is decreased. The reason is that larger secrecy codeword length means more confidential message can be insert into a secrecy codeword. Particularly, when the secrecy codeword length is small, even γ n is large, the network utility can not exceed the optimal value. 3) Although both γ n and secrecy codeword length are large, the network utility can exceed the optimal value, it can not exceed the network capacity without secrecy constraint.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the online control problem in multi-hop wireless network with security constraint.
To provide the message security in multi-hop transmission, we exploited an independent randomization secrecy encoding strategy. By the stochastic network optimization method, we develop two dynamic control policies for infinite and finite secrecy codewords length, respectively. We also proved that the proposed control policies achieve utility close to the optimal value asymptotically. Finally, we simulate both online control policies with various network scenarios. The results show that the utility value can be approached to the optimum, while the average queue backlog grows dramatically.
